A YEAR after the May 2025 conflict, the India-Pakistan relationship remains volatile. Diplomacy is frozen. Neither side has sought to break the deadlock. A war of words erupts every so often. Last week, it was over the water dispute. Then it was on the Kashmir dispute at the UN. Bilateral relations are at one of the lowest points in their tortured history.

Last month saw speculation about the revival of dialogue. It was triggered by voices from India calling for talks. RSS general secretary Datta­treya Hosabale urged engagement. A former army chief and ex-head of RAW agreed. Leaders from occupied Kashmir chimed in. Pakistan’s foreign ministry spokesman responded quickly but cautiously. Describing this as a “positive development” he said it was the official Indian line that mattered.

Speculation grew that Delhi may be testing the waters with its no-talks posture coming under increasing questioning at home. But it quickly died. There was no official Indian statement. The opposition Congress party attacked the government for “softening” on Pakistan.

India-Pakistan relations snapped back to their default mode of a tense stand-off. In fact, even track two engagement between former officials over the past year has seen no movement. Just reiterations of familiar positions. Suggestions by the Pakistani side for backchannel communication found no traction from the Indians. The Modi government, they said, was averse to any formal or informal dialogue.

India and Pakistan can’t afford another crisis and need a backchannel to prevent one.

Meanwhile, water has emerged as the new arena of India-Pakistan confrontation. Delhi had suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in April 2025, in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist incident in Pahalgam in occupied Kashmir. After the four-day India-Pakistan military clash, Indian officials repeatedly declared Pakistan would not get a single drop from ‘India’s rivers’.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to make Pakistan “feel the heat” on the issue. For over six decades, the 1960 treaty had survived wars, confrontations and tensions to provide a framework for water-sharing between the two neighbours. Now its fate hung in the balance. India’s weaponisation of water held serious long-term implications for Pakistan, posing an existential threat to its agricultural economy and water security. Its immediate impact was, however, limited. This was because India lacked the infrastructure or enough dams to halt the flow of water or significantly divert it.

Over the past year, Pakistan repeatedly protested against India’s use of water as an instrument of coercion and warned any diversion of Indus river flows would be deemed an “act of war”. It also sought to draw international attention to the issue. Islamabad pointed out that India’s decision to put the treaty into “abeyance” had no legal basis. The treaty does not allow either party to unilaterally suspend or abrogate it. But Delhi rejected Islamabad’s protests and said the treaty would remain suspended “until Pakistan ends its support for cross-border terrorism”.

More significantly, the Indian government now says it is “actively working” on Prime Minister Modi’s directive to halt water flows to Pakistan. Last week, India’s minister of water, C.R. Patil declared that it was being ensured that “not a single drop of water will go [to Pakistan] in coming years”. This involves restoring and expanding the capacity of existing reservoirs and creation of new ones.

Delhi announced projects to build canals that will divert water from Pakistan’s Chenab river system into the Beas basin. Islamabad called this interference in downstream flows a violation of both the IWT and broader principles of international water law.

The Indian government also unveiled plans for silt flushing from the Salal Dam reservoir on the Chenab river in occupied Kashmir. Islamabad has also objected to this plan which will enable India to increase effective storage and regulate flows in ways that could exceed the IWT’s limits. This is not permissible under either the treaty or the 1978 Salal Agreement.

Putting the treaty in abeyance doesn’t legally allow India to undertake these two river projects that can threaten irrigation supplies critical for Pakistan’s agricultural heartland. But that hasn’t stopped Delhi. The two countries also continue to clash over the IWT’s dispute settlement mechanism.

For years, they have disagreed with India rejecting and boycotting the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and ignoring its rulings. It called, instead, for a neutral expert. The IWT provides for both. But Delhi now rejects these mechanisms and has disassociated itself from both. This means there is no avenue or forum to resolve water disputes.

It is not just India’s aims to weaponise water that concern Islamabad. Its post-May 2025 moves to rearm itself and upgrade its military capabilities are also consequential for Pakistan. The Modi government raised India’s defence budget to a record $85billion this year. It has ordered over a 100 more Rafale fighter jets from France. It also plans to buy an unprecedented number of armed drones and additional S-400 air and missile defence systems.

Missile development and purchases have accelerated. More alarmingly, India is now mating nuclear warheads to missiles and deploying a small number with operational forces in peacetime, according to SIPRI’s latest 2026 handbook. This is a dangerous departure from the posture of recessed deterrence adopted by both India and Pakistan, by which they have kept warheads and launchers de-mated.

The current phase of ‘no war, no peace’ is expected to continue. The Modi government is not interested in resuming any dialogue. In fact, its post-2019 approach to Pakistan is characterised by three key features. One, that Kashmir is off the negotiating table. Two, the relationship will be seen through the narrow lens of terrorism with Delhi grading Pakistan’s ‘good behaviour’. And three, diplomatic engagement is a concession Pakistan will have to ‘earn’. For Pakistan, these terms are unacceptable. This makes for dim prospects for resumption of formal dialogue anytime soon.

India and Pakistan can’t afford another crisis. They have had five in the past 25 years, each one more dangerous than the last. They have to find a way — and mechanism — to prevent the next crisis and manage one if it breaks out. This urges the need to revive the backchannel between the two countries. It worked between 2019 and 2024. This kept the line of communication open. Today, it is needed even more not just to manage crisis but also explore how old and new disputes can be resolved.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.

Published in Dawn, June 15th, 2026